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ABSTRACT
This paper considers the impact of liberalized trade policy on child labor in a developing country.
While trade liberalization entails an increase in the relative price of the exported product, trade theory
provides ambiguous predictions on how this price change affects the incidence of child labor. In this
paper, we exploit regional and intertemporal variation in the real price of rice to examine the relationship
between price movements of a primary export and the economic activities of children. Using a panel of
Vietnamese households, we find that reductions in child labor are increasing with rice prices. Declines
in child labor are largest for girls of secondary school age, and we find a corresponding increase in school
attendance for this group. Overall, rice price increases can account for almost half of the decline in child
labor that occurs in Vietnam in the 1990s. Greater market integration, at least in this case, appears to be
associated with less child labor. Our results suggest that the use of trade sanctions on exports from
developing countries to eradicate child labor is unlikely to yield the desired outcome.
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1.  Introduction 
Much of the recent policy debate and controversy surrounding globalization and the WTO has 
been focused on the issue of child labor in poor countries.  On the one hand, opponents of market 
integration argue that globalization may increase the wages paid to working children or increase the 
earnings opportunities of children in poor economies, thereby increasing child labor.  Some further 
suggest that rich countries should restrict the sale of goods from developing countries that lack or do not 
enforce child labor laws.  Yet many doubt the ability of trade sanctions to eliminate child labor (Bhagwati 
(1995), Maskus (1997)).
1  Theoretical models by Maskus (1997), Melchior (1996), and Ranjan (2001) 
show that trade sanctions or import tariffs against countries that use child labor do not necessarily reduce 
the incidence of child labor.  Alternatively, increases in household income and increased availability of 
schooling opportunities in low-income countries could help reduce child labor (Basu 1999).  Some argue 
that liberalized trade and increased access to world markets could help eradicate child labor by raising the 
standard of living in these poorer economies (Bhagwati (1995), Dixit (2000)).
2 
Given the theoretical ambiguity about the relationship between child labor and trade discussed in 
detail in section 2, surprisingly little empirical research examines the link between product market 
integration (or liberalized trade policy specifically) and child time allocation.
3  This paper uses variation 
in the domestic price of a country’s primary staple and export product to consider this relationship.  
Specifically, we consider the link between changes in the price of rice in Vietnam and changes in child 
labor.  From 1993 to 1998, the average domestic price of rice increased 29% relative to the consumer 
price index.  Part of this rice price increase stems from the relaxation of a rice export quota.  Out of 
concern for domestic food security and a desire to suppress the domestic price of rice, the Vietnamese 
                                                 
1 Maskus (1997) provides an overview of the broader literature on international trade and labor standards.   
2 Although the effect of trade on a country's standard of living is ambiguous in theory, Frankel and Romer (1999) 
provide evidence that more open economies enjoy higher real income. 
3 Hanson and Harrison (1999) provide a survey of the impact of trade liberalization on labor markets in developing 
countries.  A set of studies focuses on the determinants of child labor such as child age, gender, missing markets, 
parental income, and school availability (Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977), Levy (1985), Patrinos and 
Psacahropoulos (1997), Psacharopoulos (1997), Edmonds (2001a & b)).  Rodrik (1996) examines the link between 
labor standards (including child labor laws), international prices, and trade flows.  Krueger (1996) explores the 
determinants of the support for the Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1995 in the U.S. House of Representatives.  
Grootaert and Kanbur (1995), Maskus (1997), and Basu (1999) survey these studies.  2 
government began administering a rice export quota in 1989.  Since then, the government has gradually 
liberalized its export regime, allowing rice exports to more than double (to about 3 million tons in 1996).  
By 1997, Vietnam's export quota was no longer binding, and Vietnam was fully exposed to the 
international price of rice (Goletti and Minot 1997).   
During this period of liberalization, communities across Vietnam experienced large intertemporal 
and regional variation in the relative price of rice.  In this study, we relate regional and intertemporal 
variation in the relative price of rice to variation in child labor using the Vietnam Living Standards 
Survey (VLSS), a 4,000 household panel spanning the period of quota changes.  We complement the 
household survey with detailed price data from a community (psu) level price survey conducted at the 
time of the household interviews.  Our empirical approach compares changes in the economic activities of 
children across communities that experience different changes in the relative price of rice over time.  We 
control for unobserved differences across communities and households that may be correlated with 
changes in the relative price of rice and child time allocation by exploiting the panel structure of our data.  
To the extent that trade liberalization affects the price of a commodity, our analysis illustrates the 
potential impact of trade policy even though all of the price variation in our data does not stem directly 
from changes in the rice export quota.
 4  We are not aware of any other empirical research that relates 
change in child labor to changes in product prices. 
Vietnam provides an ideal environment to address the relationship between child labor and trade.  
First, worldwide child labor is most prevalent in very poor countries such as Vietnam (with a GNP per 
capita of $310 in 1997).  Using cross-country data, Krueger (1996) shows that most child labor occurs in 
countries with extremely low per capita GDPs and that per capita GDP (and its square) explains 80 
percent of the worldwide cross-country variation in child labor.  Yet, very little research focuses on the 
impact of trade policy on well-being in these countries (Winters (2000), Dollar and Kraay (2001)).  
Second, a significant portion of the population in developing countries derives its income from 
                                                 
4 Ichimura and Taber (2000) argue for using retrospective price changes to study proposed policies.  Our approach is 
consistent with their suggestion as well as many previous trade studies that rely on within-country data to explore a 
trade-related phenomenon.  See Hanson and Slaughter (2001) for an example.  3 
agriculture.  In Vietnam, for example, 70% of the population in 1993 works in the agricultural sector, and 
rural (predominantly agricultural) households are generally much poorer than their urban counterparts.  
Finally, although much of the public attention focuses on the exploitation of child labor in manufacturing 
establishments, most child labor occurs in agricultural activities and household production (ILO/UNICEF 
1997).  In Vietnam in 1993, 26% of children ages 6 through 15 work in agriculture; only 4% work for 
household run non-agricultural enterprises; and less than 3% work for wages outside of the household.  
The VLSS enables us to track child participation in activities within households and in formal and 
informal labor markets. 
We find large reductions in child labor associated with the observed increases in the relative price 
of rice.  A 30 percent increase in price of a kg of rice leads to about a 9 percentage point decline in child 
labor.  The effect of rice price increases varies by household exposure to rice prices through production 
and consumption.  Children in households that own land experience especially large reductions in child 
labor associated with rice increases.  An increase in the relative price of rice (potentially stemming from 
liberalized trade policy) enhances rural household income.  Households appear to substitute the extra 
income captured by household landholdings for income previously earned by children.  This extra income 
appears to particularly benefit older girls who experience the largest declines in child labor and the largest 
increases in school enrollment.  Hence, child labor declines even though globalization also raised the 
potential earnings of children.  In this way, our evidence suggests that greater integration of unskilled 
labor abundant developing economies into world markets can be associated with less child labor.  We 
discuss the policy implications of our findings in the conclusion to the paper. 
2.  Theory Motivation  
Several theoretical papers address the relationship between product prices, trade policy, and child 
labor in developing economies that are relatively abundant in unskilled labor.  Trade policy affects the 
prices of a product produced by child labor (or adult labor), thus influencing the allocation of child time.  
Using different theoretical settings, these studies show that the effect on child labor of a foreign tariff (i.e. 
a decline in the price of the exported good) depends on the assumptions one makes in modeling.  These  4 
ambiguous theory predictions and the lack of empirical evidence provide the main motivation for our 
empirical work. 
Maskus (1997) models an economy producing an export and import-competing good in a 
specific-factors framework.  Adult labor is mobile across the two sectors.  In addition, the export sector 
subcontracts from the informal sector, which employs children.  Maskus shows that the imposition of a 
foreign tariff on the exported good ambiguously affects the incidence of child labor, depending on the 
elasticity of substitution between child and adult labor in the production of the export good.  Melchior 
(1996) sets up a specific-factors model in which child labor is a factor specific to the export sector.  The 
foreign tariff on the exported good reduces the good's price, lowers the returns to child labor, and 
decreases the labor market participation of children.   
The above models abstract from the household decision to send children to work.  Basu and Van 
(1998) and Baland and Robinson (2000) explicitly model the household choice of child labor and suggest 
that the household decision to send children to work (or to educate them) ultimately depends on the price 
and returns to education, the price of the goods that household consumes and produce, adult wages, child 
wages, and the household discount rate.  Brown (2000) and Dixit (2000) discuss the implications of 
punitive foreign tariffs on child labor using a simplified version of Basu and Van (1998).  Basu and Van 
(1998) assume that child labor is a bad in parental preferences.  Thus, when household income from adult 
wages surpasses some threshold, families withdraw the children from the labor market.  This yields a 
discontinuity in the labor supply at the threshold wage and multiple labor market equilibria.  A ban on 
child labor can then move an economy from an equilibrium with low wages and child labor to an 
equilibrium with high wages and no child labor.  Brown (2000) and Dixit (2000) argue that foreign tariffs 
do not necessarily reduce child labor in this set up: the implication of the effect of trade policy on child 
labor depends on the slope of the labor demand curve and the elasticity of substitution between child and 
adult labor.  For example, when the economy is fully integrated in the world market, wages are 
completely determined by international product prices (i.e. the labor demand curve is perfectly elastic).   5 
By lowering the price of a product exported by developing countries, protectionist measures by the 
industrialized countries might then actually increase the incidence of child labor.   
A household model by Ranjan (2001), where child labor stems from credit constraints, also yields 
an ambiguous relationship between trade policy and child labor.  He models an economy that produces a 
high-skill and low-skill intensive good and is endowed with skilled and unskilled adult labor.  Child labor 
is an imperfect substitute for unskilled adult labor.  Household welfare depends on current household 
consumption and on the discounted future welfare of children.  The model implicitly assumes that the 
present discounted value of education exceeds the present discounted value of child labor.  In each period, 
a parent decides whether to send a child to school or to work.  Ranjan shows that trade sanctions might 
not reduce the incidence of child labor in a long run model of trade based on relative endowment 
differences across countries (Hecksher-Ohlin).  An increased foreign tariff lowers the wages of unskilled 
workers and increases the returns to educated workers in an economy that is relatively abundant with 
unskilled labor.  While the returns to education increase (making it less likely for parents to send children 
to work), households endowed with unskilled labor also become poorer and thus more credit constrained 
(making it more likely for parents to send children to work).  This second effect likely dominates the first 
for a credit-constrained household with unskilled parents.   
Although these models differ in the assumptions on the structure of the labor market, the structure 
of the economy, and the household decision making process, they ultimately encompass similar channels 
through which product price affects child labor.  Let us review these channels for the case of the rice price 
increase (potentially instigated by the relaxation in rice export quota) studied in this paper.  Rice is 
important in Vietnam in both consumption and production.  Prior to liberalization (1993), rice constitutes 
44% of all food expenditure and 29% of expenditure overall.  70% of all farmland in Vietnam is devoted 
to rice and 98% of all communities report growing some rice (authors' calculations from the VLSS).  
Thus, we expect large and dramatic effects of rice price changes.  First, we consider how rice price 
increases affect the opportunity cost of time in various activities.  Agriculture is the most common arena 
in which children work.  Increases, in the price of rice, then, raise the value of a child's time spent in  6 
agriculture.  Hence, we expect to see children work more (this is a main argument of globalization 
opponents).  In addition, increases in the price of rice also raise the value of adult time in agriculture.  
This might induce adults to shift their time towards rice production, increasing the demand for child labor 
in other activities.  Obviously, the comparative advantage for adults and children in different types of 
work determines which of these two effects dominates.  Moreover, by increasing (reducing) the rewards 
to schooling or through households becoming more (less) forward looking (with lower discount rates), 
liberalization might raise (decline) the present value of child time spent in activities such as schooling 
rather than working.  
Rice price increases also affect household income.  First, child labor might be a bad in parental 
preferences (as in Basu and Van (1998)).  If higher rice prices lead to an increase in household income, 
child labor should decline.  Alternatively, if credit-constrained households were unable to finance child 
schooling (as in Baland and Robinson (2000) or Ranjan (2001)), the additional income from liberalization 
allows parents to overcome at least part of their credit constraint.  However, most rural households in 
Vietnam are not only rice producers but rice consumers.  Rice is the primary staple of the Vietnamese 
diet.  While increases in rice prices may augment household income, the consumption based income 
effect of the price change may leave households that are large net consumers of rice worse off.  This 
negative income effect may force households to increase the incidence of child labor.   
In view of the ambiguity in the predictions in economic theory, we address the relationship 
between child labor and liberalized trade empirically.  Despite a large empirical literature that studies the 
determinants of the child labor surveyed in Grootaert and Kanbur (1995), to our knowledge no empirical 
study relates child labor to changes in product prices (potentially stemming from a trade policy change).   
3. Data  description 
We examine the relationship between product prices in the rice sector and child labor using two 
rounds of the VLSS that spans the period of quota changes.  The first round of the VLSS was conducted 
between September 1992 and October 1993.  The second round of the VLSS revisited 151 communes 
from the first round between December 1997 and December 1998.  In our analysis, we focus on  7 
households with children that appear in the 151 panel communes.  4305 households are revisited in the 
second round of the survey, and at times, we restrict our source of identifying information to data from 
these panel households.
 5  The household survey includes questions on household composition, the labor 
activities of adults and children, education, expenditure, land holdings, and agricultural activities.  The 
household survey is accompanied by a community questionnaire that includes a detailed price information 
as well as information on local employment opportunities and wage rates.
6,7  Table 1 reports basic 
summary statistics from the data. 
The approach of this paper is to relate changes in the price of rice to changes in the economic 
activities of children.  We thus begin with a description of the rice price changes.  The first row in table 1 
reports the consumer price of a kilogram of ordinary rice in 1993 and 1998 collected in the community 
price survey.
8  We deflate the price of rice with the monthly consumer price index so that all prices are in 
000s of 1998 (January) Dong.  One U.S. dollar corresponds to approximately 14,000 Dong in 1998.
9  
Throughout this paper, whenever we refer to rice price changes, we mean changes in the real (deflated) 
prices of a kilogram of rice.  The average domestic price of rice increased by 29% relative to the rise in 
the consumer price index.  Benjamin and Brandt (2001) document similar increases in consumer unit 
                                                 
5 Glewwe and Nguyen (2000) discuss attrition in the VLSS panel households and conclude that the panel households 
appear to be nationally representative.  89.6% of the households that appear in the first round of the VLSS reappear 
in the second round.  In panel communes, missing households were replaced with randomly selected households.   
6 We have also compared the prices reported in the commune questionnaire with the average commune price based 
on unit values of purchased rice from the household survey.  They are highly correlated.   
7 We face a choice of using the wage data reported by a commune official in the community survey or wages 
reported from the household survey.  Wages at the household level depend on household labor supply, which is 
jointly determined with child labor.  Aggregating over households in a commune could in principle solve this 
problem, but in many communes, we observe very few (at times zero) households reporting wage work, so we 
choose to use wages from the community survey.  The wage rates are day wages for agricultural laborers.  These are 
only available for rural communes.  Hence, we only report results with wages for rural areas.  For adult wages, we 
focus on the wages paid to male day laborers at harvest time.  Child wages are reported irrespective of gender, and 
because of data availability, we focus on child wages averaged across all agricultural seasons.  In Vietnam, wages 
are often paid in cash and in-kind, and the commune official was instructed to impute a value of in-kind wages in 
answering the question.  In addition, in 36 out of 278 commune-year observations, we are missing wage rates from 
the community survey.  We impute wages for these communes based on commune average expenditure per capita 
using the same procedure as for rice (below).  We follow the same procedure for adult and child wages. 
8 6 communes do not report the price in at least one of the survey rounds.  We impute the rice price in these 
communes.  Based on the unit value of rice purchased by households reported in the VLSS, we calculate the mean 
unit value of a kg of rice for a commune in a given survey year.  We regress the price of rice reported in the price 
survey on the third order polynomial of the mean unit value of rice in a commune.  We replace the missing price 
data with the predicted value of commune price based on this regression. 
9 The price deflator does not vary by region, because we do not want the deflator to drive the variation in rice prices.  8 
prices.
10  Our analysis in this paper is based on differences across communes in changes in rice prices.  
Figure 1 plots the data that underlies our analysis.  The horizontal axis is the real price of rice in a 
commune in 1993, and the vertical axis is the real price of rice in a commune in 1998.  The 45 degree line 
is also pictured.  144 out of 151 communes in the VLSS experienced a considerable increase in the real 
price of rice.  Moreover, the variation in rice price changes across communities is substantial.  This across 
community variation in the relative rice price change is the source of our identification below.   
Vietnam experienced national and international market integration during the time of our sample.  
Although it is impossible to disentangle the effects of rice quota on prices from other factors that could 
affect prices, some evidence suggests that Vietnam's integration into international markets played an 
important role.  Absent international integration and unobserved demand and supply shocks, national 
market integration would likely lead to convergence of prices across regions with prices in rice surplus 
regions increasing and the prices in rice deficit regions declining.  However, the prices increase 
dramatically in all regions during these two periods.  For example, while the rice prices increased by 23 
percent in the North, they increased by 35 percent in the South.  The South supplies most of the 
Vietnamese rice exports.  Moreover, figure 1 suggests that these increasing prices do not appear to be 
converging to one price level.  The standard deviation of rice prices across communes is the same in 1993 
and 1998.  These two factors (larger increases in the South and a lack of convergence) are suggestive of 
the importance of increased exposure of Vietnamese rice sector to international markets. 
A more detailed examination of regional patterns of changes in rice prices further indicates that 
some of this price variation is plausibly associated with the rice export quota.  Goletti and Minot (1997) 
describe the rice sector and the sources of rice exports in Vietnam.  While almost all of Vietnam produces 
rice, the largest source of rice exports is the Mekong River Delta and the Southeast.  In figure 2, we plot 
real rice prices in 1993 and 1998 by the 8 main administrative regions in Vietnam.  In 1993 rice prices are 
highest in the most isolated regions of Vietnam (Central Highlands (CH) and the Northern Uplands (NW 
                                                 
10 The correlation between consumer prices and unit prices in levels is .68.  The correlation between changes in 
consumer prices and unit prices (our source of identification below) is .81.  9 
and part of NE).
11  Goletti and Minot suggest that, in these regions, rice is grown primarily by small 
farmers for their own use, and some additional rice is imported from surrounding areas.  The five main 
rice producing areas all have lower prices in 1993 than the three more remote regions; the largest rice 
producing area, the Mekong River Delta, has the lowest prices in 1993.  In 1998, the remotest regions 
(CH and NW) still have among the highest rice prices.  However, two of the highest priced regions are the 
main exporting regions, the Mekong River Delta and the Southeast.  In fact, the Mekong River Delta has 
grown from the lowest priced region in 1993 to the fourth highest in 1998.  The price changes that take 
place in the Mekong and in the Southeast are similar to what we would expect with a liberalization of the 
rice export quota.  We obviously cannot claim that the price variation we observe across Vietnam is 
attributable singularly to the change in the rice export quota.  However, to the extent that trade 
liberalization affects the price of a commodity, our analysis illustrates the potential re-distributive impact 
of trade policy even if quota changes are not the sole cause of the price increase.   
Children in Vietnam engage in a wide range of activities that might be influenced by rice price 
changes.  Table 2 describes the economic activities of children in Vietnam in 1993 and 1998.  In this 
study, we focus on the economic activities of children between the ages of 6 and 15 within the last seven 
days.  We restrict our attention to this age group, because the VLSS do not collect data on the allocation 
of time for household members below the age of 6.  15 is the upper age limit in many international 
conventions on child labor.  The VLSS data describe child time allocation in a number of activities.
12  In 
                                                 
11 Dollar and Glewwe (1998) describe regional differences in poverty and inequality in Vietnam. 
12 The weaknesses inherent in using the VLSS to discuss child labor questions are discussed in Edmonds and Turk 
(2001), and three issues seem particularly important in our study.  First, there may be a sizable, unregistered migrant 
population in Vietnam that would be missed entirely in the VLSS' sampling frame (Poverty Working Group 1999).  
Second, the VLSS are household surveys, so children who are not resident within households are missed in the 
survey.  Thus, we miss street children and many of the worst forms of child labor such as prostitution and many 
forms of slavery.  Edmonds and Turk investigate whether children disappear from VLSS panel households between 
1993 and 1998.  They found that a maximum of 26 out of 6003 children between ages 0 and 10 in VLSS panel 
households in 1993 could have left their household for work by 1998.  This obviously misses children in households 
that collapsed or otherwise disappeared between rounds of the survey.  Nevertheless, for recaptured households, 
sending (or selling) children away from a sampled household to work is unlikely to be an important source of bias.  
Third, the VLSS does not provide data on the working conditions of children, and there are problems with the way it 
records hours of work outside of household work.  We think that the quantity of work and work conditions may be 
more income and price elastic than is participation.  Hence, focusing on participation rates alone may miss many 
interesting dynamics associated with rice price changes.  10 
addition to schooling, we know whether a child works outside of the household for pay or as a domestic 
servant, works in agriculture for the household, works in a household business, or performs household 
work and chores such as cleaning, cooking, washing, shopping, collecting water or wood, and building or 
maintaining the house, its surroundings, or furniture.   
While table 2 summarizes participation rates in each of these activities, in this study, we focus on 
an aggregation of these categories as a definition of child labor.  Namely, a child engages in child labor if 
it works for seven or more hours per week in household work and chores or if the child works for one 
hour or more per week in agriculture, wage employment, a family business, or as a domestic servant.
13  A 
number of characteristics stand out from table 2.  First, most children are engaged in child labor in 1993 
even though Vietnam officially banned child labor in 1988.  By 1998, only 38% of children are working, 
which corresponds to a 33% reduction in child labor between 1993 and 1998.
14  Edmonds (2001b) shows 
that most of the decline in child labor in rural households can be explained by improvement in living 
standards.  Our present study can be viewed as an examination of one possible explanation of 
improvement in living standards.  Second, most working children manage to simultaneously attend 
school.  While 57% of children in 1993 work, only 18% of children work without attending school.  By 
1998, only 7% of children work without attending school.  However, Edmonds and Turk (2001) 
document a strong negative correlation between work and schooling.  Secondary school age children that 
work in agriculture or businesses are 23% less likely to attend school than children who do not work.  
                                                 
13 This definition of child labor matches the definition employed by the International Labor Organization in many of 
its SIMPOC country studies (ILO n.d.).  Moreover, it overcomes three main conceptual problems that would arise 
from failing to consider the activities performed by children in the production of nontradable goods (home 
production).  First, when a child works outside of its household as a paid domestic servant or a slave that child is 
classified as a child laborer under the most stringent of definitions.  It seems hard to defend reclassifying the child's 
production activities as something other than work if the child's employer changes (even if it changes to a parent).  
Second, treating the production of nontradables as something other than child labor makes it difficult to interpret the 
meaning of the state of "not working."  For example, if home production is ignored in the definition of child labor, a 
child that stops limited work in a family business to take over extensive household responsibilities (say, because of 
the absence of a parent) would appear to stop working.  Third, an assertion that child participation in the production 
of nontradables is not an economic phenomenon (or of economic interest) implies that including home production in 
a definition of child labor should attenuate our results.  To the extent that participation in the production of 
nontradables varies with changes in the relative price of a market good, it clearly is of economic importance. 
14 These participation rates imply that 7.86 million children work in Vietnam in 1993 and 5.64 million children work 
in 1998.  11 
Third, children predominantly perform household work and chores and work within the household in 
agriculture.  Rice price changes affect both of these types of work.  The relationship between rice prices 
changes and agricultural work is obvious.  Household work may be associated with rice price increases if 
parents are more active in agriculture or formal labor market activities.  We observe a 15% decline in 
agricultural work and actually an increase in household work.  However, this increase in household work 
is not statistically significant and appears to be associated with less time in household work on average 
(mean hours in household work decline from 6.0 to 4.4 hours, a statistically significant decrease).  Fourth, 
work outside of the household is extremely rare for children in Vietnam.  Only 4.4% of children ages 6-15 
in 1993 report any work outside of the household in the last week.  In the 1998 data, the fraction of 
children working outside of their household declines to 2.7%.  Hence, the typical newspaper image of 
overworked children spending long hours in factories is simply not typical of child laborers in Vietnam.  
By far, most children either work in agriculture or participate in household work and chores. 
4. Results 
4.1 Rice Prices and Child Labor: Basic Results 
Our analysis is based on comparing changes in the probability a child works across communities 
that experience different price changes over time.  We begin by considering this relationship 
nonparametrically.  For each commune, we compute the fraction of children working in 1993 and 1998 
and subtract the 1998 mean from the 1993 mean to obtain the decline in the share of children working in 
the commune.  We plot the decline in child labor in a commune against the increase in the commune real 
rice prices in figure 3.  The regression line pictured in figure 3 is the result of a nonparametric regression 
of the decline in child labor against the increase in rice prices where we have weighted observations by 
the number of children in each commune in 1993.
15  The vertical line in figure 3 is at the mean rice price 
increase.   
                                                 
15 We use a local linear regression procedure with a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of .38 chosen by visual 
inspection.  Regressions are weighted by the number of children in sampled households in the commune in order to 
be consistent with the linear regression work below.  The 1993 sample is self-weighting so there is no additional 
correction for sample design necessary.  12 
Two characteristics stand out in Figure 3.  First, for most of the distribution of increases in the 
relative price of rice, the larger the increase in rice prices, the larger the decline in child labor.
16  Thus, an 
extreme outlier is not driving our results.  Moreover, when we turn to a parametric regression framework, 
we expect that small increases in rice prices are associated with declines in child labor.  Second, we do 
not observe a decline in child labor with increases in the relative price of rice in the few communities that 
experience declines in the relative price of rice and communities with extremely large (twice the mean) 
increases in the price of rice.  Thus, these communes attenuate the apparent positive relationship between 
rice price increases and the decline in child labor.   
In the remainder of this paper, we consider the relationship between child labor and rice prices 
using a linear probability model.
17  For a child j in commune i at time t, we estimate: 
(1)  112 . ijt it jt t i ijt yR P XT β αα λ ε =+ + + +  
y is the indicator for whether the child engages in child labor and RP is the natural logarithm of the real 
price of a kilogram of ordinary rice.
18  Several features of this framework should be highlighted.  First, the 
probability a child labors might differ across households because of differences in the gender and age 
composition of children.  We control for gender and age differences using a third order polynomial in 
child's gender and age and all of their interactions.  We also control for seasonal variation in rice prices by 
including season indicators.  X is the vector of age, gender, and season controls.  Second, we control for 
economy-wide time differences in the probability a child works with a year indicator T that is one if the 
survey year is 1997/98 (1992/93 is the omitted year).  Third, (1) also includes commune fixed effects λ .  
Communes vary in the availability of schooling, labor market conditions, land and resource endowments, 
and integration into the Vietnamese economy.  These commune characteristics might also affect the 
relative price of rice and bias any estimate of the relationship between child labor and rice prices.  To the 
                                                 
16 The correlation between rice prices and the probability of child labor is also negative when we consider the 1993 
and 1998 cross section separately. 
17Alternatively, we could use a probit model.  Neither the flavor of our results nor our elasticity estimates are heavily 
influenced by our choice of assumption about the regression error distribution.    
18 The findings in this paper are not sensitive to the choice of including prices (or land area below) in logs or levels.    13 
extent these commune characteristics are time-invariant, we can control for them using commune fixed 
effects (we consider time-varying commune characteristics in the next section).  Finally, in all regressions 
in this paper, the standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the commune 
(psu)/survey round level.  
Table 3 provides the basic results.  Column 1 presents estimates of  1 β  and  2 α  from (1).  We find 
a positive and significant association between increases in rice prices and declines in child labor.  A 30 
percent increase in price of rice is associated with a 10 percentage point decline in child labor.  Of course, 
households vary in their exposure to rice prices increases.  Households that produce rice may capture 
additional income from rice price increases, but rice consumers have to pay more for the rice they 
consume.  Households that do not produce rice directly from their own land but work in rice production 
related activities or in communities that produce or process rice may also benefit from rice price 
increases.  Thus, we divide households into three groups: rural households (A), households in urban areas 
that do not participate in agriculture (U), and households in smaller towns that have some agriculture or 
related activities (M).  We allow the relationship between rice prices and child labor to vary across these 
areas by interacting an indicator for the area where a child lives with rice prices.  Thus, for a child j in 
commune i at time t, we modify (1) and estimate the following: 
12 3 1 2 ** ijt it it i it i jt t i ijt yR P R P U R P M XT ββ β αα λ ε =+ + + + + + . 
1 β is the change in the probability a child works for a 1 percentage point change in rice prices in rural 
areas,  2 β is the extra increment in the probability a child works in non-agricultural urban areas ( 1 β +  2 β  
is the total effect), and  3 β is the extra increment for mixed areas ( 1 β + 3 β is the total effect).  Column 2 of 
table 3 presents estimates of  1 β ,  2 β ,  3 β , and  2 α  for the entire sample.  In rural areas, higher rice prices 
are associated with declines in child labor.  In mixed areas, we observe a slightly smaller (albeit not 
statistically different) decline in child labor with rice price increases than in rural areas.  However, rice 
price increases are associated with more child labor in urban areas that cannot take advantage directly of  14 
these rice price increases.  A 30% increase in rice prices is associated with almost 5 point increase in child 
labor for urban households.   
Since the three areas differ in the impact of rice price changes on child labor, it makes sense to 
stratify our subsequent analysis by the area type.  However, the urban and mixed community sample sizes 
are too small to be considered separately, and most of the community level data that we use subsequently 
are not available in urban areas.  Moreover, in the present context, the ambiguity in the relationship 
between globalization and child labor discussed in section 2 is concentrated in rural households that must 
weigh increased household income against increased earnings opportunities for children and adults and 
the negative income effect (through consumption) of price increases.  Hence, in the remainder of this 
paper, we restrict our attention to children that reside in rural households.  In column 3 of table 3, we re-
estimate (1) for the rural sample.  A 30 percent increase in rice prices is associated with a 9 percentage 
point decline in the probability that a child works.  Given that rural areas experience a 20 point drop in the 
probability that a child works between 1993 and 1998, rice price increases can account for 45% of the 
decline in child labor in rural areas.   
So far, we have focused on how rice price increases affect the probability that an individual child 
works.  At the same time, households might also transition between states of having child labor to a state 
without child labor.  We examine how these transitions are related to rice price increases in household 
level regressions.  Column 4 considers whether all children in the household work.  Increases in rice price 
reduce the probability that all children in a household work.  A 30 percent increase in the price of rice 
reduces the probability that all children in a household work by 11 percentage points.  In column 5, we 
consider whether no children in the household work.  The results suggest that a 30 percent increase in the 
price of rice is associated with an 12 point increase in probability that no children within a household 
work.  In sum, rice price increases are not only associated with declines in probability that a child works, 
but also in declines in probability that all children in a household work, and increases in probability that 
no children in a household work.  
4.2 Rice Prices, Child Labor, and Other Time-Varying Factors  15 
  The results in section 4.1 suggest that increased rice prices are associated with less child labor.  
The concern obviously arises whether we can interpret this positive correlation as a causal effect of rice 
price changes on child labor.  The positive relationship could simply reflect unobserved, time-varying, 
commune-specific shocks that affect both rice prices and child labor but have nothing to do with the link 
between the two.  In this section, we consider several time-varying factors that may yield such a spurious 
correlation. 
   Let us first clarify the nature of the time-varying factors that concern us.  Differential changes in 
the price of rice across communes might be driven by supply or demand shocks to local rice markets.  If 
there is a causal effect of rice prices on child labor, these supply and demand shocks will be associated 
with a change in child labor.  This is the type of variation that we wish to exploit.  For example, some 
communities improve their roads between 1993 and 1998.  Setting aside the concern that these road 
improvements may be financed by additional rice income, improved roads facilitate a community’s 
integration into rice markets and thereby increase rice prices.  We wish to capture the effect of these 
increased prices on child labor.  However, we do not want our measure of the effect of rice prices on child 
labor to reflect the effect of improved roads on child labor that have nothing to do with the rice price 
increases.  The latter is the spurious correlation that we are concerned about. 
  We expect four general sources of a spurious correlation between rice prices and child labor.  
First, within communities, there may be heterogeneity in households that is correlated with both rice price 
increases and child labor.  Since we identify the effect of rice prices on child labor with community*time 
variation in rice prices, we do not believe that this household heterogeneity generates bias.  Nonetheless, 
we re-estimate (1) with household rather than commune fixed effects.  The relationship between rice 
prices and child labor is identified by averaging within household variation in child labor across  16 
communes with variation in commune changes in real rice prices.  The results are reported in column 1 of 
table 4 and suggest that the inclusion of household fixed effects does not alter the results substantively.
19   
Second, section 3 shows that rice price increases vary across regions in Vietnam.  Likewise, 
regions differ in both the types and scope of the reforms experienced in Vietnam in the 1990s.  Further, 
regions may be segmented somewhat so that it is difficult for labor to move easily between them.  Hence, 
changes in the returns to schooling may vary across regions.
20  These unobserved, region-specific, time-
varying shocks could potentially bias the link between child labor and rice prices.  As a result, we allow 
for region-specific time-varying unobserved factors in (1) by including the interactions of each region 
indicator with a year indicator.
21  The results are reported in columns 2 (commune fixed effects) and 3 
(household fixed effects) of table 4.  Controlling for regional variation in how child labor declines 
through time, does not alter our estimates of the relationship between rice prices and child labor in 
statistically significant way. 
Third, rice price increases vary with a community’s accessibility.  More accessible communities 
might experience larger rice price changes, because they are more integrated into regional and 
international markets.  Likewise, children in more accessible communities might have better access to 
schools or employment opportunities.  In the VLSS, we can measure accessibility by an indicator for 
whether regular transportation is available to a commune and an indicator for whether the road to a 
commune is paved.
22  We interact these accessibility measures with year indicators to allow for a different 
change in child labor in accessible communities.  Estimates of (1) with additional controls that allow 
trends in child labor to vary with accessibility or regions conditional on rice price changes are reported in 
columns 4 (commune fixed effects) and 5 (household fixed effect).  Note that heterogeneity in rice price 
                                                 
19 The 9,545 child-year observations in the rural sample are drawn from 4,630 household-year observations.  With 
household fixed effects we identify off of the 1,675 rural households that have children between the ages of 6 and 15 
in both rounds of the panel.  These households have on average 2.24 children between ages 6-15 in each round. 
20 Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) find changes in the return to education to be a primary determinant of changes in 
educational enrollment in Green Revolution India.  Glewwe and Jacoby (2001) rule out differential changes in the 
return to education as an explanation for increases in school enrollment in Vietnam.  Instead, they find that increases 
in household income drive Vietnam's increases in secondary school enrollment. 
21 There are between 4 to 35 sampled communes per region (the mean and median are both 25 communes per 
region). 
22 Data on accessibility (and infrastructure in general) is only available in the 1998 survey.  17 
changes within regions or across accessible communities still allows us to identify an effect of rice prices 
on child labor.  If there is spurious correlation between rice price changes and child labor associated with 
accessibility or regional differences, we should observe a significant change in our estimates of the effect 
of rice prices on child labor.  However, our commune fixed effects estimates of the relationship between 
child labor and rice prices are virtually identical to what we found without controlling for regional or 
accessibility differences (compare column 4 of table 4 to column 3 of table 3). 
A fourth likely source of omitted heterogeneity that may drive our relationship between child 
labor and rice prices may be infrastructure improvements.  Van de Walle (1998) finds that public 
infrastructure (and in particular, irrigation) improvements could dramatically improve living standards in 
Vietnam.  The 1998 community survey asks whether the commune has experienced any infrastructure 
improvements since the 1993 survey.  An infrastructure improvement is defined as improvements in 
roads, irrigation, health facilities, electricity, schools, and "other" public infrastructure.
23  In table 5, we 
allow communities to experience differences in child labor through time with infrastructure 
improvements.  We do this by including an interaction of whether the community experiences an 
infrastructure improvement between 1993 and 1998 with the year effect.  In column 1, our infrastructure 
measure is an indicator that is 1 if the community experiences any type of infrastructure improvement.  In 
the remaining columns, we consider each of the infrastructure improvement separately.  With every 
infrastructure control, our estimates of the relationship between child labor and rice prices are well within 
a 95% confidence interval of our estimate in column 3 of table 3.  
Of course, a conceptual problem arises in interpreting these infrastructure changes, because 
during the 1990s, the government of Vietnam had little revenue for large-scale infrastructure 
improvements.  Hence, these community improvements may stem from within community demand; in 
that manner, additional rice income could cause improvements in infrastructure.  This is particularly 
likely with schooling.  Vietnam entered the 1990s with high primary school enrolment rates (86%), and 
                                                 
23 The 1998 questionnaire asks whether there have been improvements in any of the listed types of infrastructure.  It 
does not distinguish between new infrastructure and physical or quality improvements in existing infrastructure.    18 
nearly universal access to primary schooling.  The government made primary school free and compulsory 
in 1991 by the introduction of the Law on the Universalization of Education, but subsequent to this, there 
were no major government initiated school construction or improvement projects between 1993 and 1998 
(Nga, forthcoming, surveys the education sector in Vietnam in the 1990s).   However, increases in 
community income (through rice price increases, for example) may lead to private demand for 
educational improvements.  Using the 1993 VLSS, Behrman and Knowles (1999) show that educational 
expenditure in Vietnam is highly income elastic.  Glewwe and Jacoby (2001) consider school attendance 
in the VLSS panel.  They observe large increases in (especially secondary) school enrollments, and they 
find a strong association between increases in household income and school attendance.  Hence, the 
school infrastructure improvements that we observe in the data may stem in part from rice price driven 
improvements in household income.     
Overall, we do not find any evidence in table 4 to suggest that spurious correlation drives the 
relationship between rice prices and child labor.  Nevertheless, one could still argue that idiosyncratic 
shocks to either rice prices or child labor and associated with both, that have nothing to do with 
infrastructure, regional heterogeneity, or commune accessibility could drive the link between prices and 
child labor.  If rice price levels in 1993 are independent of declines in child labor other than through the 
association between rice price levels in 1993 and the increase in rice prices between 1993 and 1998, we 
can approach the idiosyncratic shocks problem in an instrumental variables setting.  Consider the 
following commune-level first-difference regression framework for commune i: 
(2)      *. ii i cy p u αη ∆= +∆ + 
cy ∆ denotes the decline in fraction of children working in a commune between 1998 and 1993 and 
p ∆ denotes the change in rice price in a commune between 1998 and 1993.
24  u represents the 
specification error that might include an omitted variable that drives changes in prices and changes in 
child labor in a commune.  If this source of bias is idiosyncratic in the sense that it is independent of the 
                                                 
24 This regression is equivalent to the commune fixed effects regressions in equation (1) without the child specific 
controls.  19 
level of rice prices in 1993, we can instrument for changes in commune prices in (2) with the level of rice 
prices in 1993 using two-stage least squares (2SLS).   
For the price level in 1993 to be a valid instrument, it must be correlated with changes in rice 
prices in rural communes.  Figure 4 pictures the relationship between increases in rice prices between 
1998 and 1993 and the 1993 price level.  The depicted regression line is the result of a nonparametric 
regression of the decline in rice prices against the rice price level in 1993.
25  Figure 4 illustrates a strong 
correlation between changes in prices and the 1993 level.  As we would expect from our discussion of 
rice prices in section 3, price increases are the largest in areas with the lowest prices in 1993.  This is also 
confirmed in the first stage of the 2SLS, where changes in rice prices are regressed on 1993 price levels 
and a constant.  The coefficient on 1993 rice price level is -.87 with a t-statistic of -8.3, and the rice price 
levels in 1993 account for 45 percent of the variation in rice price changes across communes.   
Table 6 contains the estimates of equation (2).  The dependent variable is a decline in child labor, 
so a positive coefficient on the change in rice price implies a decline in child labor.  Column 1 is the 
linear regression on the data pictured in figure 3.  It reports the results without instrumenting for changes 
in prices, and we find a positive relationship between rice price increases and declines in child labor.  
Columns 2-7 report 2SLS results, and our estimates of the positive relationship between increases in rice 
prices and declines in child labor increase rather disappear.  The coefficient in column 2 suggests that the 
average increase in the price of rice in rural areas (.765) would reduce child labor by 15 points.  Given 
that the coefficient is imprecisely estimated, this estimate is not very different from the estimates in 
section 4.1.  The relationship is also robust to inclusion (in first and second stages) of region indicators 
(column 3), commune accessibility (column 4), and accounting for improvements in schooling (column 
5), any infrastructure (column 6), or inclusion of indicators for all infrastructure improvements 
individually (column 7).  Hence, idiosyncratic shocks (unrelated to the local rice market characteristics 
                                                 
25We use local linear regression procedure with Gaussian kernel and the bandwidth of .45 chosen by visual 
inspection.  20 
captured by the 1993 rice price) do not appear to be behind the relationship between child labor declines 
and rice price increases. 
In sum, our results suggest a negative relationship between product price increases and child 
labor in rural areas.  We find little evidence that our results are driven by likely sources of spurious 
correlation between child labor declines and rice price increases or idiosyncratic shocks.  The estimates 
are economically significant:  a 10 percent increase in the relative price of rice is associated with a 3 
percentage point decline in the probability that a child works.  Given that the price of rice increased on 
average by almost 30 percent during our sample, our estimates suggest that this price hike leads to almost 
9 percentage point decline in the probability that the child works.  Thus, increases in rice prices explain 
45 percent of the 20 percentage point decline in child labor that rural areas of Vietnam experienced 
between 1993 and 1998.  Greater integration into international markets, at least in this case, is associated 
with less child labor. 
5.  Understanding the Link Between Rice Price Increases and Declines in Child Labor 
5.1 Rice Prices, Land Holdings, and Child Labor 
In this section we further explore the mechanism through which rice prices affect child labor.  As 
we discussed in section 2 and saw in section 4.1, because households differ in their consumption and 
production of rice, the impact of increases in product prices will vary across households.  For example, 
while 70% of households produce rice, only 35% sell rice in 1993, and 7% of households never buy or 
sell rice (authors' calculations from the VLSS).  Accounting for household landholdings provides one way 
to capture household heterogeneity in exposure to any costs or benefits of rice price increases.
26  Land is 
an important input into rice production, and households with greater production capacity should benefit 
more from rice price increases.  Most rural households own agricultural land, but 16% of the rural 
children in our sample live in households that do not own any agricultural land.  In our analysis, we treat 
                                                 
26 We have considered two other measures of a household's exposure to rice price changes: net rice production and 
the benefit – expenditure ratio (Deaton 1989, Benjamin and Deaton 1993, Minot and Goletti 1998).  As with 
landholdings, we find that child labor reductions are largest in households that theoretically should benefit most 
from increases in rice prices.  We choose to present the landholdings results, because we feel that the assumptions 
necessary for identification are weaker with landholdings.  21 
land holdings in 1993 as an endowment, and this is obviously a strong assumption.  However, land 
markets in Vietnam had yet to develop by 1993, and in general, commune officials had allocated land to 
households for long-term contracts (Ravallion and van de Walle 2001).  In this section, we assume that 
the reduction in child labor experienced by a household between 1993 and 1998 does not effect land 
allocation in 1993, and we consider how the 1993 land holdings co-vary with the amount by which the 
household reduces its child labor in reaction to rice price increases. 
   We modify our methodology in the previous section by including the natural logarithm of 
household land holdings, L, and an indicator for whether the household owns any agricultural land, ANY.  
In addition, we interact the price of rice with the household's land holdings (both in logs) and the indicator 
for whether the household owns any agricultural land.  Thus, for a child j in household h resident in 
commune i at time t, (1) becomes: 
1 2 93 3 93 1 2 3 93 4 93 ** ijht it it h it h jt t h h i ijht y RP RP L RP ANY X T L ANY ββ β αα α α λ ε =+ + + + ++ + +  
Our results are in the first two columns of table 7.     
Several patterns emerge in the commune fixed effects results of column 1.  First, children in 
households that hold small amounts of land are slightly more likely to work relative to children in 
households with no landholdings.  The coefficient on whether the household owns any land captures the 
effect of landholdings for households that own negligible amounts of land. Conditional on rice prices, a 
child in a household with a negligible amount of land is .1 more likely to work than a child in household 
with no land (evaluated at the mean of log price in rural areas 1.06).  Conditional on rice prices and on 
holding some land, a 10 percent increase in landholdings leads to a .1 point decrease in child labor.  Thus, 
in the absence of rice price changes, the probability that a child works decreases in landholdings, but 
simply holding any land is associated with greater child labor.  Second, the response of child labor to rice 
price changes varies across households with different landholdings.  A 30 percent increase in the price of 
rice decreases the probability that a child works by 6.7 percentage points for households with no 
agricultural land.  This suggests that factors other than land might influence how a household benefits  22 
from rice price increases.  In the next section, we find that part of the effect of the rice prices on child 
labor appears to be related to increases in local wages.  Small agricultural landholders appear to benefit 
the least from rice price increases.  A 30 percent increase in rice prices is associated with a 19 percentage 
point increase in child labor in households with negligible amount of agricultural land.  Children in 
households that hold larger quantities of land are the main beneficiaries of the rice prices increase.  
Agricultural households above the 13
th percentile in landholdings experience a larger reduction in child 
labor than households with no landholdings.
27  At the mean land holdings, a 30 percent increase in rice 
prices is associated with a 9.5 percentage point decline in child labor for households that hold agricultural 
land.  Thus, higher rice prices seem particularly beneficial for large landholders, and conditioning on land 
holdings produces results that are consistent with the rice price elasticity of child labor found in the 
previous section.
28 
Inclusion of household fixed effects (column 2), does not alter our results for households with 
greater landholdings.
29  For households with the mean landholdings, the change in child labor associated 
with respect to a change in rice prices is well within the range of estimates reported in the previous 
section (table 3).  Our estimate of the landholdings necessary for a landed household to observe a greater 
decline in child labor with an increase in rice prices than a non-landholding household declines from the 
                                                 
27 The median and mean log landholding in 1993 for a rural household that holds land are both 8.24 (Ravallion and 
van de Walle 2001 document the relative equity in the distribution of land after 1988 in Vietnam).  The 13
th 
percentile is 7.44.  The 3
rd percentile (below) is 6.21 and the 2
nd is 5.74. 
28 In section 4.2, we have shown that community-specific time varying unobserved shocks are unlikely driving our 
results.  The results on the landholdings in this section are based on within commune variation and they further 
confirm this claim.  The omitted variables would need to be correlated with prices, and would need to vary by 
commune, time, and the level of landholdings within the commune.  One possibility would be that communes 
experience commune-specific improvements in the returns to education (that are correlated with price changes) and 
that credit constraints are less severe for landholders, so that child labor declines by more in households with more 
landholdings because they now send kids to school.  However, this is unlikely to be the case.  First, the existing 
evidence on the returns to education in Vietnam does not find support for the existence of substantive commune-
level variation in changes in the return to education (Glewwe and Jacoby 2001, Nga forthcoming).  Second, we 
expect that variation in the returns to education (if they exist) should be more important at the regional level than the 
commune level, because regions are more segmented than are communes within regions.  However, controlling for 
unobservable, time-varying regional factors did not alter our estimates of how rice prices relate to child labor in 
section 4.2. 
29 Because we allow the effect of rice prices to depend on landholdings from 1993 (we do not want to identify off 
changes in landholdings as a result of rice price increases), we cannot include both the level of land holdings and the 
household fixed effect.  Also, if we restrict our sample to only households that have landholdings, we obtain 
virtually identical results (as one would expect: with the inclusion of the 'own any land' dummy variable in the table 
4 regressions, we identify the interaction of landholdings and rice prices only on households that have landholdings).  23 
13
th percentile in column 1 of table 4 to the 3
rd percentile of landholdings in column 2.  This slight 
difference is not statistically significant, but may reflect the fact that smaller landholders are generally 
poorer and perhaps less likely to move children in and out of work with rice price changes.  This might 
introduce an upward bias on the coefficient on the indicator for whether a household owns any land.  The 
household fixed effect controls for this type of variation and thereby makes it more likely to observe 
declines in child labor associated with price increases in even smaller landholders.  The most substantive 
change related to household fixed effects, is that we cannot reject the hypothesis that rice price increases 
only reduce child labor in landholding households with greater than the 3
rd percentile of land.  At first 
glance, this result seems inconsistent with the results from within community variation in column 1.  
However, rural households without land often work for wages.  In the next section, we find that wage 
increases, while associated with rice price increases, are strongly correlated with the year effect (e.g. 
wages increases are less variable across communities than are rice price increases).  Hence, conditioning 
on the household fixed effect captures the difference between households with and without agricultural 
land, the interaction of landholding with rice prices describes how child labor varies across landholders, 
and the year effect absorbs the decline in child labor in wage households.
30     
In columns 1 and 2 of table 7, most of the heterogeneity in the relationship between rice price 
increases and child labor appears to be associated with landholdings.  One possible source of bias in our 
findings is that between 1993 and 1998 some communities in the VLSS redistribute land.  Ravallion and 
van de Walle (2001) describe Vietnam's massive land reform in 1988.  It was complete by 1993, but 
several communes in the VLSS report additional redistribution between 1993 and 1998.  If this land 
reform affects the allocation of child time in a manner associated with household landholdings before 
redistribution and is likewise associated with rice price increases, our results in columns 1 and 2 may 
confound the impact of redistribution with that of rice prices.  Hence, we bifurcate our sample into 
children in communities that redistribute land between 1993 and 1998 and children in communities that 
                                                 
30 This implies that, without the year effect, we should observe a negative correlation between rice prices and child 
labor even for households that do not own agricultural land.  In supplementary regressions, we have found this.  24 
do not.  In the remaining columns of table 7, we reproduce the main findings of this paper for children in 
rural communities that did not redistribute land between 1993 and 1998.  Our findings in columns 3-7 of 
table 7 are generally consistent with our results for the full rural sample.  Estimates of the magnitude of 
the reduction in child labor associated with rice price increases are slightly larger (compare column 3 with 
column 3 of table 3), but they are well within a statistical confidence band of the full sample results.  
Likewise, the variation in the relationship between child labor and rice prices associated with 
landholdings is of a similar magnitude in the full sample (columns 1 and 2) and the non-reforming sub-
sample (columns 5 and 6).   
The previous section found a robust negative relationship between rice price increases after the 
market integration and the incidence of child labor.  The evidence in this section suggests that these 
average effects vary across households principally based on household landholdings.  Rice price increases 
reduce child labor especially in households with larger landholdings.  A 30 percent increase in the price of 
rice reduces child labor for the mean (median) landholding household by approximately 9 percentage 
points.  This is the same average effect we obtain in the previous section when we do not condition on 
landholdings.  Thus, differences in landholdings seem to account for most of the variation in the effect of 
rice prices on child labor across households.  The results for households with negligible landholdings or 
no landholdings are mixed.  Some of these results suggest that rice prices might affect household time 
allocations through channels other than land.   
5.2 Rice Price, Local Labor Markets, and Child Labor 
Because rice is the primary agricultural commodity in Vietnam, increases in the price of rice 
should raise both adult and child wages by raising the value of labor's marginal product.  Conditional on 
endowments of labor, land, and technology, an increase in the price of rice raises the value of labor's 
marginal product and, in competitive labor markets, increases wages in agriculture.  As we discussed in 
section 2, this raises the opportunity cost of not working and could increase child labor.  Some 
specifications in the previous section suggest that increases in rice prices are associated with declines in  25 
child labor even in households that do not produce rice.  In this section, we consider the relationship 
between changes in wages, changes in rice prices, and child labor. 
  We expect the price of rice to drive wage changes so we explore how the inclusion of wage 
variables as controls affects the sensitivity of child labor to rice prices.  These results are in table 8.  First, 
conditional on commune fixed effects (column 1), child labor is positively correlated with child wages.  
Thus, higher wages are associated with more child labor (as one would expect).  Likewise, without 
controlling for child wages (column 2), higher adult wages are associated with more child labor (albeit 
not in a statistically significant way).  This is consistent with the theoretical literature on child labor where 
children are substitutes for adult labor (Basu 1999). 
Second, the adult wage elasticity of child labor in column 2 is substantially lower than that of 
child wages in column 1.  Thus, while adult wages and child wages are positively correlated, adult wages 
might have an additional impact on child labor that is associated with a reduction in child labor.  This is 
confirmed in column 3.  Conditional on rice prices and child wages, higher adult wages are negatively 
correlated (although not in a statistically significant way) with child labor.  Higher child wages are 
positively correlated with child labor conditional on adult wages and rice price increases.  Hence, to the 
extent that rice prices increase child wages, this increases child labor.  However, the overall effect of rice 
price increases is to decrease child labor.  Household fixed effects regression (column 4) yields similar 
results as within commune regression in column 3.   
Part of the reason that the correlations between changes in wages and child labor are statistically 
insignificant is that the year effect absorbs much of the year-to-year variation in wages.  When we do not 
condition on the year indicator, we observe a significant negative effect of adult wages on child labor 
(column 5).  A 10 percent increase in adult wages is associated with a 1.5 point decline in child labor.  
Exclusion of the year indicator radically inflates the association between rice price changes and child 
labor.  Consequently, while adult wage increases seem to lead to less child labor, this is not the dominant 
effect.  The evidence of the previous section suggests that increased income to rice producers is the 
dominant mechanism driving the effect of rice prices on child labor.  In order to check the robustness of  26 
this finding, we include the wage controls in the regressions with landholdings from the previous section 
(column 6).  The results are basically the same as in column 2 of table 7 in previous section.  
Hence, conditional on adult and child wages, most of the variation in how rice prices relate to child labor 
appears to be associated with differences in landholdings.   
However, even conditional on wages, we still observe a negative association between child work 
and rice prices, albeit a statistically insignificant one.  In section 4.2, we found that controlling for 
infrastructure improvements such as school improvements did not substantively affect our estimated rice 
price elasticity of child labor.  However, school improvements, to the extent that they are associated with 
rice price increases and child labor, may be an important explanation for the relationship between rice 
price increases and child labor declines in households that do not hold any land after controlling for 
wages and allowing the effect of rice prices to vary across landholdings.  In column 7, we include an 
indicator for whether the community reports any improvements in schools (construction or other physical 
improvements) between the two rounds of the VLSS interacted with the year effect.  The most substantive 
impact of conditioning on schooling improvements is to further attenuate the coefficient on rice prices for 
households that do not own land once we condition on wage increases.  The coefficient drops from -.04 to 
.00.   
In sum, we find some suggestive evidence that increases in child wages encourage child labor 
(given rice price changes and adult wages) and higher adult wages (given child wages and rice prices) 
lower child labor.  Even conditional on wage changes, there is still a negative association between rice 
price increases and child labor in household that do not hold land.  These households appear to be 
benefiting primarily through school improvements.  Overall, the extra return captured by landholders 
appears to be the primary mechanism through which rice price changes relate to child labor.     
5.3 Age, Gender, Rice Prices, and Child Labor 
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The economic activities of children might vary with a child's age and gender.
31  These gender and 
age differences may be purely economic: a child age 6 is a less capable worker in most activities than is a 
child age 15; a female may have comparative advantage in certain types of activities.  In addition, gender-
typing of economic and household activities may contribute to different age/gender distributions of the 
activities of children.    If boys and girls perform different activities, they may be differentially affected 
by changes in rice prices.  In this section, we explore age and gender differences in the relationship 
between rice prices and child labor and consider how rice prices are associated with changes in various 
components of our definition of child labor. 
  Table 9 documents participation rates by gender and age group in various economic activities in 
1993 and 1998.  We split children into 3 age groups: 6-11, 12-13,14-15.
32  Column 1 presents the fraction 
of children reporting ever attending school.  Column 2 indicates school attendance at the time of the 
household survey for children who report having ever attended school (children who report that they are 
on summer break from school are coded as currently attending).  Column 3 is the measure of child labor 
used throughout this study.  Columns 4-8 are the components of child labor described in the context of 
table 2.  Column 9 documents the number of hours spent by a child in home production conditional on 
engaging in home production. 
Table 9 reveals four important gender and age differences in child labor.  First, girls work more 
than boys, and the gap between genders in child labor participation rates increases with age.  In 1993, the 
participation rates in child labor for primary school age girls are 6.3 points higher than they are for boys.  
The difference is 8.6 points for ages 14-15.  Second, most of the gender differences in work occur in time 
spent in home production (especially in more than 7 hours of home production).  Third, in tandem with 
the increasing child labor participation rates, school attendance is declining in age, and the gap in 
                                                 
31 See Edmonds and Turk (2001) for a full account of gender and age differences in the economic activities of 
children in Vietnam. 
32Children ages 6-11 in Vietnam normally attend primary school.  Ages 12-13 are a natural transition period in 
Vietnam.  Children who began schooling late are still in primary school.  Students that have completed primary 
school either end their schooling or begin lower secondary education.  By ages 14-15, students that attend school are 
enrolled in secondary school, while many others work.    28 
schooling between boys and girls is increasing in age.  Fourth, between 1993 and 1998 older girls 
experience the largest increase in school attendance (over 100%).  This increase in attendance is 
accompanied by a 25% decline in child labor that stems in part from large declines in the fraction of older 
girls working excess hours in home production. 
  We next relate these age and gender difference to changes in rice prices, by allowing the effect of 
rice prices to differ with child’s gender and age group in equation (1):  
(3)    
1 2 12 13, 3 14 15,
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S is an indicator that is 1 if the child is a boy (girl is the omitted category).   age G  is an indicator that is 1 
of the child is in the indicated age group (primary school age is the omitted category.  Thus, the 
coefficient on the price of rice  1 β  gives the change in the dependent variable (eg child labor 
participation) with a change in rice prices for primary school age girls.  The extra change associated with 
being a 12-13 year-old girl is the coefficient on  12 13 G − ,  2 β .  The extra change associated with being a 
boy 12-13 is the coefficient on the male*RP interaction  4 β  plus the additional increment associated with 
being a boy age 12-13  5 β  (i.e. the total change in child labor for a boy age 12-13 with a change in rice 
prices is  1245 ββββ +++).     
The results are reported in table 10.  Columns 1, 3, and 5 condition on commune fixed effects.  
Columns 2, 4, and 6 are household fixed effects results.  Three main results appear in table 10.  First, 
column 2 suggests that girls experience the largest decline in child labor, and the magnitude of the decline 
is increasing in age.
33  This suggests that groups with the largest participation rates in 1993 experience the 
largest declines in child labor.  Second, boys (especially the primary school aged) experience the largest 
                                                 
33Based on column 2, a primary school age girl lowers her child labor participation by 2.5 points with a 10% 
increase in prices.  A 12-13 year old girl lowers participation by 3.1 points, and a 14-15 year old girl lowers her 
participation by 3.2 points.  A primary school age boy lowers his participation by 2.4 points, a 12-13 year old boy 
lowers by 2.6 points, and a boy age 14-15 lowers his participation by 3.1 points. 
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increase in having ever attended school with rice price increases (columns 3 and 4).  This is consistent 
with a recent improvement in living standards.  Of course, current school attendance provides a much 
better measure of schooling.  The third main result apparent in columns 5 and 6 of table 8 is that 
conditional on having ever attended school, girls and the oldest boys experience the largest increases in 
attendance with rice price increases (both groups had the lowest attendance rates in 1993).  The increase 
in school enrollment for girls associated with rice prices is increasing in age.  Based on column 6, a 30 
percent increase in rice prices raises the probability that a girl ages 12-13 attends school by 3.3 points and 
by 7.5 points for girls ages 14-15.  Boys experience smaller increases in schooling with rice prices and 
actually declines in schooling for ages 6-13.  Boys aged 14-15 appear to increase schooling by 3.5 points 
with a 30 percent change in rice prices.  Overall, rice price increases are associated with the largest 
declines in child labor for the age and gender groups that have the highest participation rates.  These 
declines in child labor are accompanied with the largest increases in schooling for these same groups. 
  Our results have so far focused on the overall measure of child labor.  The question also arises 
how rice prices affect different components of this variable.  We estimate equation (3) with participation 
in the individual components of child labor as the dependent variable.  Table 11 presents the results (we 
report only household fixed effects results).  Three main results appear.  First, young boys and girls 
experience an increase in agricultural work, while older girls and boys experience declines in agricultural 
work.  Second, rice price increases do not affect child participation in home production, but are associated 
with declines in excessive time spent (more than 7 hours a week) in home production.  This decline is 
larger for girls than for boys, and the decline increases with age for girls.  Third, the overall changes in 
hours spent in home production are not small.  A 30% increase in rice prices is associated with a 34% 
decline in hours worked in home production for primary school age girls and a 38% decline for girls ages 
14-15. 
Declines in child time devoted to household production raises the question whether households 
substitute away from home production or if adult household members spend more time in household 
production with rice price increases.  Increases in rice prices might lead to a decline in home production if  30 
additional income allows households to buy market substitutes for goods or services previously produced 
in the household.  Parents increase their time spent in home production if the additional income associated 
with rice prices encourages them to cut back their formal labor supply or if rice prices somehow increases 
the return to home production (although the latter is hard to imagine).  Thus, we consider whether rice 
price increases are associated with an overall decline in household time spent in home production and 
whether rice price increases are associated with changes in the total fraction of hours in home production 
performed by children.  These results are in table 12. 
  The first three columns consider the logarithm of total hours spent in household work as a 
dependent variable.
34  Column 1 includes commune fixed effects, column 2 includes household fixed 
effects, and column three includes household fixed effects, landholding interactions, wages, and school 
improvement information.  Two main results appear in the first three columns of table 12.  First, rice price 
increases are associated with declines in total hours spent in household production by the household.  This 
decline exceeds the drop in hours spent in household work by children.  This suggests that adults also 
spend less time doing household work.  Of course, differences in the time required to perform a given 
household task across household members make it difficult to interpret these results.  For example, the 
decline in hours worked in home production may still exceed the decline in hours worked by children if 
parents take over tasks previously performed by children (such as wood or water collection).  Second, the 
decline in home production associated with rice price increases is increasing in landholdings.  Households 
above the 2
nd percentile in landholdings experience a net decline in home production with rice price 
increases.  At the mean landholdings, a 30% increase in rice prices is associated with an 18% decline in 
total household time devoted to home production. 
  Despite the overall decline in home production, the fraction of household production time 
performed by children also declines.  This is evident in columns 4-6 of table 12.  Focusing on column 6 
with household fixed effects, landholdings, wages, and school improvements, we find that increases in 
rice prices are not associated with any change in the mix between child time and adult time in home 
                                                 
34 All but three households report more than 1 hour a week in household production.    31 
production for households with no landholdings.  However, the fraction of home production time 
attributable to children decreases in landholdings with rice price increases for households above the 13
th 
percentile in landholdings (i.e. households with small landholdings experience an increase in the fraction 
of home production time performed by children).  Thus, children in households with larger landholdings 
appear to reduce their hours disproportionately more than adults.  Hence, adults with relatively large 
landholdings are bearing a larger share of the home production burden as rice prices increase.  We cannot 
identify whether adults take over tasks previously performed by children (perhaps as a result of a decline 
in other types of work with the additional income captured by landholdings) or if adults use additional 
income from land to buy market substitutes for the goods and services previously produced by their 
children.  
  In sum, older girls that were bearing most of the work burden within households in 1993, appear 
to benefit the most from rice price increases.  Our results suggest a large reallocation of older girls out of 
work, accompanied by large increases in their school attendance.  Much of their decline in child labor 
occurs through reductions in home production, where parents take over a large share of the home 
production time as the agricultural land provides additional income from rice price increases.   
6.  Conclusions 
This paper provides some empirical evidence on the relationship between market integration (or 
globalization) and the incidence of child labor in poor, relatively unskilled-labor abundant economies 
through exploiting regional and intertemporal variation in the relative price of an agricultural staple.  We 
find that in the present case, increases in the relative price of rice result in declines in child labor.  A thirty 
percent rise in the relative price of rice (as experienced in Vietnam) is associated on average with a 9 
percentage point decrease in child labor.  Thus, rice price increases can account for 45 percent of the 
decline in child labor experienced in rural Vietnam between 1993 and 1998 and 47 percent of the overall 
decline in Vietnam.
35  However, child labor actually somewhat increases in urban areas where households 
                                                 
35 2.2 million less children are working in 1998 than in 1993.  Thus, our regression estimates suggest that rice price 
increases have moved 1 million children out of work.  32 
are exposed to rice prices as consumers, but cannot take advantage of rice price increases as producers or 
agricultural day laborers. 
In considering the mechanisms through which rice prices affect child labor, our results suggest the 
households better endowed with land experience larger reductions in child labor when rice prices 
increase.  We provide some suggestive evidence that the incidence of child labor might also decline in 
households who do not own agricultural land, because higher rice prices are associated with higher (adult) 
agricultural wages, but additional income to land appears to be the dominant driving force behind the 
reductions in child labor that we observe.  This additional household income to land benefits secondary 
school aged girls the most.  Their child labor participation rates decline substantively and a dramatic 
increase in school attendance accompanies the decline in child labor for these girls.   
This study has several implications for the policy debate on globalization and child labor.  First, the 
increased earnings opportunities associated with globalization for children working in export-oriented 
sectors do not necessarily lead to more child labor.  In the present case, households appear to have taken 
advantage of higher income after the rice price increase to reduce child labor despite increased earnings 
opportunities for children.  Second, many globalization opponents and trade policy-makers advocate that 
higher income countries employ trade sanctions to force domestic policies in poor countries to eradicate 
child labor.  These trade measures likely lower the price of the exported good, so our results suggest that 
sanctions could instigate more rather than less child labor.
36  These results are in line with a model by 
Ranjan (2001), where trade measures not only lower the returns to child labor, but also adversely affect 
adult income (or how credit constrained households are), and hence increase the incidence of child labor.  
Third, the impact on child labor of punitive trade sanctions against a country's exports depends on the 
distribution of the resources used in production of the exported good.  In the present case, rice production 
is so widespread in Vietnam (most household produce rice directly or as hired labor) that the lower prices 
                                                 
36 It is possible, of course, that punitive sanctions may induce countries to adopt reforms that benefit children in the 
long run.  Opponents of globalization often advocate sanctions to induce official bans on child labor.  Whether or 
not these benefit children is an open question.  Vietnam was one of the first countries (in the late 1980s) to officially 
ban all forms of child labor.  33 
of the exported good associated with trade sanctions would affect most households.  It is possible to 
imagine a world where production was so concentrated that the "costs" of any such sanctions were 
restricted to a relative minority.  Finally, the sign of the effect of international market integration on local 
prices is obviously of great importance.  Integration lowers prices of import-competing goods and might 
have different implications for child labor in households associated with the production of an import-
competing product.  However, as in the present case, most child (and adult) labor in poor, relatively 
unskilled labor abundant economies occurs in either nontraded sectors or export-oriented sectors.  
Integration leads to higher prices in the export sectors.  The additional income from these price increases 
for Vietnamese households appears to be associated with a substantial reduction in child labor. 
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 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
1993 1998
mean s.e. mean s.e.
Rice Prices
Number of Communes 151 151
Rice Price (000 of 98 Dong) per Kg 2.60 0.03 3.34 0.03
Household Characteristics
# of Sampled Households 4,693 4,710
% Urban 0.22 0.03 0.16 0.03
Rice Expenditure (000 98 Dong) 2,355 57 2,575 45
Total Expenditure 11,191 571 12,929 483
Household Size 5.93 0.09 5.47 0.07
# of Children 6-15 1.62 0.04 1.51 0.04
% Producing Rice 0.70 0.03 0.72 0.03
Rural Commune Characteristics*
Male Adult Agricultural Day Wages 14.75 0.75 19.25 0.66
Child Agricultural Day Wages 8.00 0.31 9.03 0.29
All means are weighted to reflect sampling probabilitiy and standard errors are corrected for sample design.  
All nominal variables are deflated by the monthly price index and expressed in January 1998 000s dong.  
Because of a change in sample design between 1993 and 1998, some additional rural households were added 
within panel communes (Basic Information 2000).  Hence, the number of rural households increases.  
Household means are over all survey households.  Some of these househould do not have any children ages 6-
15.  *Commune characteristics, adult wages, and child wages are for rural communes only, and for each of 
these three groupings there are many communes missing data.  For each row (considered separetely), we have 
kept only the commune information for communes where we have both 1993 and 1998 data.  Hence, while 
1993 is comparable to 1998, none of the rows of commune information are nationally representative.T
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o
r
 
w
o
r
k
s
 
7
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
h
o
u
r
s
 
p
e
r
 
w
e
e
k
 
i
n
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
 
w
o
r
k
 
o
r
 
c
h
o
r
e
s
.
 
 
W
e
 
a
r
e
 
m
i
s
s
i
n
g
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
 
w
o
r
k
 
f
o
r
 
5
9
 
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
.T
a
b
l
e
 
3
:
 
C
h
i
l
d
 
L
a
b
o
r
 
a
n
d
 
R
i
c
e
 
P
r
i
c
e
s
 
i
n
 
V
i
e
t
n
a
m
,
 
U
r
b
a
n
 
v
s
.
 
R
u
r
a
l
 
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
(
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
s
 
d
e
n
o
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
h
e
a
d
e
r
 
o
f
 
e
a
c
h
 
c
o
l
u
m
n
)
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
C
h
i
l
d
 
 
j
 
W
o
r
k
s
A
l
l
 
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
i
n
 
H
H
 
w
o
r
k
N
o
 
C
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
i
n
 
H
H
 
w
o
r
k
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
 
l
n
(
P
r
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
r
i
c
e
)
-
.
3
2
9
*
*
-
.
3
4
0
*
*
-
.
3
0
9
*
*
-
.
3
6
5
*
*
.
3
9
3
*
*
(
.
0
6
9
)
(
.
0
7
2
)
(
.
0
7
6
)
(
.
0
9
7
)
(
.
0
8
7
)
l
n
(
P
r
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
r
i
c
e
)
*
U
r
b
a
n
.
4
9
7
*
*
(
.
1
6
6
)
l
n
(
P
r
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
r
i
c
e
)
*
M
i
x
e
d
.
0
2
9
(
.
0
8
5
)
Y
e
a
r
 
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
-
.
1
6
5
*
*
-
.
1
6
6
*
*
-
.
1
7
8
*
*
-
.
0
5
9
*
*
.
1
8
2
*
*
(
.
0
1
9
)
(
.
0
1
9
)
(
.
0
2
1
)
(
.
0
2
8
)
(
.
0
2
5
)
C
h
i
l
d
 
A
g
e
 
a
n
d
 
G
e
n
d
e
r
 
P
o
l
y
n
o
m
i
a
l
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
H
e
a
d
 
A
g
e
 
a
n
d
 
G
e
n
d
e
r
 
P
o
l
y
n
o
m
i
a
l
n
o
n
o
n
o
y
e
s
y
e
s
S
e
a
s
o
n
 
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
 
F
i
x
e
d
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
A
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
 
R
2
.
3
3
6
.
3
3
7
.
3
3
9
0
.
1
5
3
0
.
0
9
6
C
o
m
m
u
n
e
/
Y
e
a
r
 
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
3
0
2
3
0
2
2
3
0
2
3
0
2
3
0
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
1
1
5
8
6
1
1
5
8
6
9
5
4
5
4
6
2
7
4
6
2
7
N
o
t
e
:
 
 
R
o
b
u
s
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
,
 
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
d
e
s
i
g
n
,
 
a
r
e
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
i
s
.
 
 
*
*
 
a
n
d
 
*
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
 
5
 
a
n
d
 
1
0
%
 
l
e
v
e
l
,
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
 
 
 
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
 
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
 
1
-
3
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
a
 
c
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
,
 
s
e
a
s
o
n
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
a
 
3
r
d
 
o
r
d
e
r
 
p
o
l
y
n
o
m
i
a
l
 
i
n
 
a
g
e
 
a
n
d
 
g
e
n
d
e
r
 
a
n
d
 
a
n
d
 
a
l
l
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
.
 
 
C
o
l
u
m
n
 
3
-
5
 
a
r
e
 
l
i
m
i
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
r
e
 
c
l
a
s
s
i
f
i
e
d
 
a
s
 
r
u
r
a
l
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
1
9
9
8
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
.
 
 
C
o
l
u
m
n
s
 
4
 
a
n
d
 
5
 
a
r
e
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
d
a
t
a
,
 
s
o
 
t
h
e
y
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
t
h
e
 
a
g
e
-
g
e
n
d
e
r
 
p
o
l
y
n
o
m
i
a
l
 
f
o
r
 
h
e
a
d
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
 
r
a
t
h
e
r
 
t
h
a
n
 
f
o
r
 
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
.
 
 T
a
b
l
e
 
4
:
 
C
h
i
l
d
 
L
a
b
o
r
 
a
n
d
 
R
i
c
e
 
P
r
i
c
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
T
i
m
e
-
V
a
r
y
i
n
g
 
R
e
g
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
A
c
c
e
s
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
l
n
(
P
r
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
r
i
c
e
)
-
.
2
6
9
*
*
-
.
2
9
1
*
*
-
.
2
9
3
*
*
-
.
3
1
0
*
*
-
.
3
0
7
*
*
(
.
0
9
8
)
(
.
0
8
3
)
(
.
1
0
9
)
(
.
0
9
1
)
(
.
1
1
9
)
Y
e
a
r
 
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
-
.
2
6
0
*
*
-
.
2
6
7
*
*
-
.
3
1
8
*
*
-
.
3
3
8
*
*
-
.
3
6
5
*
*
(
.
0
2
7
)
(
.
0
3
1
)
(
.
0
4
1
)
(
.
0
3
5
)
(
.
0
4
8
)
R
e
g
i
o
n
 
*
Y
e
a
r
n
o
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
A
c
c
e
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
*
Y
e
a
r
n
o
n
o
n
o
y
e
s
y
e
s
A
g
e
 
a
n
d
 
G
e
n
d
e
r
 
P
o
l
y
n
o
m
i
a
l
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
S
e
a
s
o
n
 
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
 
F
i
x
e
d
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
H
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
 
F
i
x
e
d
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
y
e
s
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
y
e
s
A
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
 
R
2
.
4
2
2
.
3
4
2
.
4
2
4
.
3
4
3
.
4
2
5
C
o
m
m
u
n
e
/
Y
e
a
r
 
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
2
3
0
2
3
0
2
3
0
2
3
0
2
3
0
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
9
5
4
5
9
5
4
5
9
5
4
5
9
5
4
5
9
5
4
5
N
o
t
e
:
 
 
R
o
b
u
s
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
,
 
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
d
e
s
i
g
n
,
 
a
r
e
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
i
s
.
 
 
*
*
 
a
n
d
 
*
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
 
5
 
a
n
d
 
1
0
%
 
l
e
v
e
l
,
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
 
 
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
 
a
l
l
 
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
a
 
c
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
,
 
s
e
a
s
o
n
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
a
 
3
r
d
 
o
r
d
e
r
 
p
o
l
y
n
o
m
i
a
l
 
i
n
 
a
g
e
 
a
n
d
 
g
e
n
d
e
r
 
a
n
d
 
a
n
d
 
a
l
l
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
.
 
 
 
I
n
 
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
 
2
-
5
,
 
a
 
r
e
g
i
o
n
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
 
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
 
y
e
a
r
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
i
s
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
.
 
 
A
c
c
e
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
i
s
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
b
y
 
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
 
t
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
 
i
s
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
 
t
o
 
a
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
e
 
a
n
d
 
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
r
o
a
d
 
t
o
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
e
 
i
s
 
p
a
v
e
d
.
 
 
I
n
 
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
 
4
 
a
n
d
 
5
,
 
a
n
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
 
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
 
y
e
a
r
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
i
s
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
.T
a
b
l
e
 
5
:
 
C
h
i
l
d
 
L
a
b
o
r
,
 
R
i
c
e
 
P
r
i
c
e
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
i
n
 
I
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
(
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
s
 
a
n
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
 
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
 
c
h
i
l
d
 
w
o
r
k
s
)
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
 
l
n
(
P
r
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
r
i
c
e
)
-
.
2
7
8
*
*
-
.
3
1
0
*
*
-
.
3
0
0
*
*
-
.
3
1
0
*
*
-
.
2
7
7
*
*
-
.
3
0
8
*
*
-
.
3
0
9
*
*
(
.
0
8
2
)
(
.
0
7
6
)
(
.
0
7
7
)
(
.
0
7
7
)
(
.
0
7
7
)
(
.
0
7
5
)
(
.
0
7
6
)
Y
e
a
r
 
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
-
.
1
3
2
*
*
-
.
1
8
1
*
*
-
.
1
7
0
*
*
-
.
1
8
0
*
*
-
.
1
6
1
*
*
-
.
1
6
1
*
*
-
.
1
8
3
*
*
(
.
0
4
4
)
(
.
0
2
4
)
(
.
0
2
1
)
(
.
0
2
3
)
(
.
0
2
4
)
(
.
0
2
2
)
(
.
0
2
1
)
I
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
I
m
p
r
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
:
A
g
e
 
a
n
d
 
G
e
n
d
e
r
 
P
o
l
y
n
o
m
i
a
l
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
S
e
a
s
o
n
 
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
 
F
i
x
e
d
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
A
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
 
R
2
.
3
3
9
.
3
3
9
.
3
3
9
.
3
3
9
.
3
3
9
.
3
3
9
.
3
4
0
C
o
m
m
u
n
e
/
Y
e
a
r
 
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
2
3
0
2
3
0
2
3
0
2
3
0
2
3
0
2
3
0
2
3
0
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
9
5
4
5
9
5
4
5
9
5
4
5
9
5
4
5
9
5
4
5
9
5
4
5
9
5
4
5
A
l
l
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
a
l
l
o
w
 
f
o
r
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
 
t
i
m
e
 
t
r
e
n
d
s
 
i
n
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
d
 
t
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
i
m
p
r
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
 
(
a
 
i
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
i
m
p
r
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
 
*
 
y
e
a
r
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
 
i
s
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
i
n
 
e
a
c
h
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
)
.
 
 
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
 
a
l
l
 
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
a
 
c
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
,
 
s
e
a
s
o
n
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
a
 
3
r
d
 
o
r
d
e
r
 
p
o
l
y
n
o
m
i
a
l
 
i
n
 
a
g
e
 
a
n
d
 
g
e
n
d
e
r
 
a
n
d
 
a
n
d
 
a
l
l
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
.
 
R
o
b
u
s
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
,
 
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
d
e
s
i
g
n
,
 
a
r
e
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
i
s
.
 
 
*
*
 
a
n
d
 
*
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
 
5
 
a
n
d
 
1
0
%
 
l
e
v
e
l
,
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
A
n
y
R
o
a
d
s
E
l
e
c
t
r
i
c
i
t
y
I
r
r
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
S
c
h
o
o
l
s
H
e
a
l
t
h
O
t
h
e
rT
a
b
l
e
 
6
:
 
C
h
i
l
d
 
L
a
b
o
r
 
a
n
d
 
R
i
c
e
 
P
r
i
c
e
s
,
 
I
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
(
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
s
 
d
e
c
l
i
n
e
 
i
n
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
i
n
 
a
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
e
)
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
P
r
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
R
i
c
e
.
1
2
2
*
*
.
2
0
6
*
*
.
2
1
9
*
*
.
2
3
1
*
*
.
2
1
6
*
*
.
2
4
1
*
*
.
2
4
2
*
*
(
.
0
3
7
)
(
.
0
6
2
)
(
.
0
7
1
)
(
.
0
7
6
)
(
.
0
8
0
)
(
.
0
8
4
)
(
.
0
8
2
)
R
e
g
i
o
n
 
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
n
o
n
o
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
A
c
c
e
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
n
o
n
o
n
o
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
I
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
s
c
h
o
o
l
a
n
y
a
l
l
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c
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r
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c
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l
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o
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n
d
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r
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r
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c
t
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d
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l
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p
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i
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c
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c
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v
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p
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c
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l
e
 
i
s
 
.
6
1
)
 
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
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p
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p
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